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В статье исследуются причины, приведшие к возрождению и усилению фундаменталистских идей в исламе. В любой системе религиозных идей существуют течения экстремистского характера, призывающие вернуться к изначальным, «чистым» от внешних влияний верованиям, однако, как правило, число их сторонников невелико. Большинство мусульман отвергают необходимость и возможность насилия против иноверцев, но нельзя отрицать, что в современных государствах с исламским населением идеи фундаментализма получают поддержку миллионов сторонников. ; This article explores the social history of fundamental Islam in the Middle East and beyond. The rise of fundamentalism is regarded as a conflict against the global forces that inadvertently promoted the evolution of radical ideas in Islam. Salafism or the original trend in fundamental Islam is rooted in the failure of secular trends of development in the Islamic world. Once a glorious Caliphate that challenged the power and influence of other states, the world of Islam ended as a conglomerate of states deeply mired in backwardness and dependent on others. The weakness of the Islamic states led to their colonial subjugation at the hands of Western powers. Awareness of the Islamic states' inferior status led to conflicting trends in Islamic thought. In the 20 th century it gave rise to a nationalism that brought to power modernizing regimes in Turkey, Iraq, Egypt and other states with a mainly Islamic population. However, in most cases secular modernization and anti-colonialism failed, giving birth to corrupt and inefficient forms of government and a lack of visible success in economic policy. The obvious failure of secular nationalism provided grounds for the renaissance of Islamic fundamentalism that sought to explain the failure of nationalism and modernization by the obvious departure of the Islamic societies from the so-called true and pure Islam that had led it to success in the times of Caliphates. Islamic theologians such as Sayiid Q'tub called on Muslims to return to pure Islam and rid themselves of Western domination. Fundamentalist ideas increased their influence in the urban areas where social despair increased social pressure. The political factor also played a role in the spread of fundamentalist ideas. The Saudi regime struck a compromise with Wahhabism and secured its own power by funding the fundamentаlists' drive to proselytize beyond what became Saudi Arabia. Islamic thinkers gradually evolved an even more violent set of ideas that came to fully reject modernity, and a reliance on a military confrontation that would put an end to the domination of the West and result in the final battle when Islam would restore its past glory. The inept policies of Western powers including the war in Iraq and Afghanistan poured oil on the fire of local frustrations. These ideas formed a basis for the creation of ISIS that has now spread its influence to many countries where Muslims are in the majority. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism emerges as a concurrence of historic trends when historic memories, the resentment of modernity, social desperation, failed hopes of nationalism and a game of global contradictions form the basis of violent extremism.

Reaching back centuries, this study makes a convincing case for very deep roots of current Eastern European backwardness. Its conclusions are suggestive for comparativists studying other parts of the world, and useful to those who want to understand contemporary Eastern Europe's past. Like the rest of the world except for that unique part of the West which has given us a false model of what was "normal," Eastern Europe developed slowly. The weight of established class relations, geography, lack of technological innovation, and wars kept the area from growing richer.In the nineteenth century the West exerted a powerful influence, but it was political more than economic. Nationalism and the creation of newly independent aspiring nation-states then began to shape national economies, often in unfavorable ways.One of this book's most important lessons is that while economics may limit the freedom of action of political players, it does not determine political outcomes. The authors offer no simple explanations but rather a theoretically complex synthesis that demonstrates the interaction of politics and economics

Why have so many of the iconic revolutions of modern times ended in bloody tragedies? And what lessons can be drawn from these failures today, in a world where political extremism is on the rise and rational reform based on moderation and compromise often seems impossible to achieve? In You Say You Want a Revolution?, Daniel Chirot examines a wide range of right- and left-wing revolutions around the world—from the late eighteenth century to today—to provide important new answers to these critical questions. From the French Revolution of the eighteenth century to the Mexican, Russian, German, Chinese, anticolonial, and Iranian revolutions of the twentieth, Chirot finds that moderate solutions to serious social, economic, and political problems were overwhelmed by radical ideologies that promised simpler, drastic remedies. But not all revolutions had this outcome. The American Revolution didn't, although its failure to resolve the problem of slavery eventually led to the Civil War, and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was relatively peaceful, except in Yugoslavia. From Japan, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia to Algeria, Angola, Haiti, and Romania, You Say You Want a Revolution? explains why violent radicalism, corruption, and the betrayal of ideals won in so many crucial cases, why it didn't in some others—and what the long-term prospects for major social change are if liberals can't deliver needed reforms. A powerful account of the unintended consequences of revolutionary change, You Say You Want a Revolution? is filled with critically important lessons for today's liberal democracies struggling with new forms of extremism.

This book analyzes widespread global ethnic conflicts that tear asunder nations and regions, such as the former Yugoslavia. Dan Chirot casts his analysis in a discussion of the conflict between national and ethnic identity, discovering that ethnic identity, rooted in centuries of tradition and habit, often trumps national identity, which may be of more recent gestation and have a weaker hold on people. His analysis affords insights into the recent aggressive U.S. posture on 'nation building,' showing the blindness of this approach to deeply-entrenched ethnic identities. His timely book can be

This book, the only brief and affordable macro-sociology text available for undergraduates, describes how societies have changed over the past five thousand years. The discussion focuses on the idea that industrial societies, despite their great success, have created a new set of recurring and unsolved problems which will serve as a major impetus for further social change. This book explores development through historical narrative and examines the globalization/development paradox through in-depth case studies

Discurso de investidura como Doctor Honoris Causa de Daniel Chirot, 10 de octubre de 2019, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas, Bucarest. ; Investiture speech as Doctor Honoris Causa by Daniel Chirot, October 10, 2019, Faculty of Political Science, Bucharest.

We are happy that communism ended mostly peacefully in East-Central Europe in 1989. That civil society channeled peaceful dissent in the northern part of this region was important. Nevertheless, it is wrong to minimize other factors. The action of the main leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States were equally or more crucial. Gorbachev's unwillingness to sustain old Soviet interventionist policies and Reagan's decision to treat Gorbachev with respect and agree to weapons reductions against the advice of many of his most hawkish advisors were necessary for this to come out well. But unfortunately, because the role of civil society was blown out of proportion, and also because the transition from communism went relatively smoothly, mistaken conclusions were drawn by American policy makers. They came to believe that civil society everywhere in the world was inclined to be democratic, peaceful, and pro-American. In fact, that has not been the case, and the kind of easy transition to free market democracy that marked much of East-Central Europe has not been replicated elsewhere, particularly not in the Middle East and Afghanistan. It might have been more appropriate to conclude from the events of 1989 that Yugoslavia, not Poland, was the case that most resembled the ethnically and religiously divided parts of the world, and to remember that even in Poland the homogeneity of the population was the result of brutal genocide, mass expulsions, and forced boundary changes that had taken place as a result of World War II.